Introduction
This report delivers the findings of an introductory investigation into the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) procedure commissioned by the Insolvency Service. The Service has issued consultation documents which have focused, in part, on the procedure 3 and this report is intended to assist in an Impact Assessment to be carried out by the Service in relation to the potential ramifications of any legislative reform of the CVA procedure.
The main thrust of the reform agenda comprised in the consultation documents has been the possible extension or enhancement of the CVA moratorium, currently available only to 'small' companies. 4 This report attempts to gauge how both types of CVA, i.e., the CVA with moratorium and the 'stand-alone' CVA, perform in terms of delivering successful outcomes for the companies subject to them and the creditors of those companies. In this regard, some attention should be paid to the definition of 'success': perhaps the orthodox view of a 'successful' CVA entails a proposal accepted by the requisite majority which eventually delivers a projected return within an expected time-scale and leaves the company intact to operate, hopefully profitably, outside a formal insolvency procedure. The same view of 'success' would probably envisage that the company emerges from the CVA under the same ownership and, perhaps, with the same management in place. 5 As will become clear, this definition of a 'successful' CVA may be somewhat onedimensional, and certain CVA outcomes, whilst not conforming with this outline, may nevertheless represent a positive result for the main protagonists concerned.
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Methodology
The Database
This investigation is empirical in nature. It considers outcomes from a sample of CVAs commencing in 2006 and for which insolvency practitioner reports were available from the Companies House Direct facility. The sample itself was taken from a dataset of all 547 CVAs recorded as commencing in 2006 by Companies House, and comprises records for 177 companies, and so amounts to 32.4% of the entire population of 2006 CVAs. Practitioner reports for the companies in the sample were downloaded from Companies House Direct and information on a number of variables was extracted from the reports and entered onto a database.
The following variables were, where information on them was available from the practitioner reports, recorded: It should be acknowledged from the outset that, in relation to several of the variables listed above, the necessary information was simply not available from the documents downloaded. This is largely because the insolvency packages available from Companies House Direct did not contain a copy of the actual CVA proposal presented to creditors. Indeed, there is no statutory requirement that supervisors file a copy of the proposal with Companies House, so that only notices to the registrar of an arrangement taking effect and notices of receipts and payments and of the eventual completion or termination of the arrangement were routinely available. Whilst there are, therefore, some substantial gaps in the analysis, it is nonetheless suggested that the information that was available provides some valuable an interesting insights into the general CVA landscape.
It should also be noted that the analysis here is, to some extent at least, historical. If a reasonably complete picture of CVA outcomes was to be presented, it was necessary to sample from cases commencing in 2006 at the latest: this is because, unlike, for example, administration, there is no statutory 'time-limit' on the CVA procedure and it is open to creditors to agree that an arrangement will last for whatever duration is proposed. Given that the perceived wisdom was to the effect that a 'typical' proposal would be for a duration of at least 36 months, it was considered that a 2006 commencement date would allow for the capture of information on eventual returns to creditors from enough cases proceeding to 'full term', as it were, to allow for a reasonably representative analysis of this particular outcome. It follows that we can only draw meaningful inferences about the population of CVAs in 2006 and do not capture in the data any subsequent shifts in CVA practice which may have taken place.
The sweep and the sample selection
The sample selection process, rather than being random, was informed by a preliminary 'sweep' of the entire population of 2006 CVAs. The Companies House Direct facility allows access to the current 'insolvency' status of any given company and it was therefore possible to record this information for all 547 companies on the original 2006 dataset. This exercise proved invaluable, in the first instance, in exposing the unexpectedly wide range of outcomes amongst the CVAs in question: it had already been agreed that it would be simplistic to record a CVA as having been either completed according to its original terms or terminated for noncompliance with those terms and that a richer analysis could be conducted if the CVAs in the sample could be grouped along different lines. In the event, the sweep presented a very clear set of outcomes in this regard. Secondly, the sweep enabled the presentation of outcomes for the entirety of CVAs commencing in 2006 and, even at that very embryonic stage of the research, directed attention to certain research questions which might inform the data extraction exercise and, further, any subsequent research into this particular area.
The sweep revealed a total of thirteen different outcomes 10 over the entire population, these being as follows: 1) Company active: the CVA was completed according to its terms and the company continued to trade to the present. 2) Company active, but proposal to strike off: the CVA was completed according to its terms but is subject to a proposal to strike off recorded at Companies House. 3) Administration ongoing: the CVA was terminated for non-compliance and the company entered administration, that procedure being currently ongoing. 4) Compulsory liquidation ongoing: the CVA was terminated for non-compliance and a winding up order was made against the company, that procedure being currently ongoing. 5) Creditors' Voluntary Liquidation ongoing: the CVA was terminated for noncompliance and the company entered into a CVL, that procedure being currently ongoing. 6) Dissolved after administration: the CVA was terminated for non-compliance and the company entered administration and was subsequently dissolved. 7) Dissolved after compulsory liquidation: the CVA was terminated for noncompliance and a winding up order was made against the company, the company being subsequently dissolved. 8) Dissolved after creditors' voluntary liquidation: the CVA was terminated for non-compliance and the company entered into a CVL and was subsequently dissolved. 9) Dissolved after members' voluntary liquidation: the CVA was completed according to its terms and was followed by an MVL after which the company was dissolved. 10) Dissolved without further procedure: the CVA was completed or terminated and was subsequently struck off the register under the voluntary striking off procedure now contained in s.1003 Companies Act 2006. 11) Members' Voluntary Liquidation ongoing: the CVA was completed according to its terms and was followed by an MVL which is still ongoing. 12) New CVA ongoing: the initial CVA was terminated and followed by a new CVA. 13) CVA ongoing: the initial CVA is still ongoing.
Having identified these different outcomes it was agreed that, as far as possible, the sample of companies for which a more detailed analysis would be carried out should be roughly proportionate, in terms of numbers for each outcome, to those for the entire population. However, it was decided that for this purpose the outcomes for any of the Federal Mogul/T&N companies should be discounted: the Federal Mogul group filed for Chapter 11 reorganisation protection in the United States of America in 2001, and 2006 saw 22 of its UK subsidiaries enter into the CVA procedure.
11 Because of the arguably 'specialist' characteristics of the underlying financial difficulties of the group as a whole, and the fact that the English CVAs were likely to involve, at least to a certain extent, some highly complex aspects of intra-group indebtedness, these cases were considered to be atypical and were therefore excluded from the sampling process. There may well, however, be scope for a detailed case study of the value of the CVA procedure in the context of very large cross-border insolvencies based on the Federal Mogul/T&N cases at some future date.
Chart 1, below, illustrates the percentage of cases of each outcome for all CVAs commencing during 2006 as revealed by the sweep. The Federal Mogul/T&N cases are included here, but as a separate category, and, as noted above, none of these cases were sampled for further analysis. Nor were cases where the original CVA was still ongoing sampled, as it was considered that they would yield insufficient information, especially on creditor returns, for meaningful analysis.
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The commentary will, however, make reference to this category in other contexts where appropriate. Chart 2, below, illustrates the percentage of cases of each outcome in the sample of 177 cases selected for further analysis. Chart 3, below, simplifies the outcomes for the entire population of CVAs along the lines of headline 'solvent' and 'insolvent': where the company emerged from the procedure intact (including the Federal Mogul/T&N cases) and was thus categorised as 'active', this would amount to a solvent outcome. By contrast, where the company entered a further insolvency procedure and was subsequently dissolved, this amounted to an insolvent outcome, as did those cases where insolvency proceedings were still ongoing. The categories of ongoing CVA cases and those where dissolution without resort to an insolvency procedure occurred are also included here.
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Observations
In very general, and perhaps simplistic terms, it would seem from the above that the 'success' rate for CVAs is disappointing. Including the Federal Mogul/T&N cases in the analysis, only 14% of the companies in the entire population remain 'active' in the sense that they emerged from the CVA and continue to trade to the present. However, it should be noted that a further 13% of cases are comprised of companies which entered into a CVA in 2006 and continue to be subject to it. On the assumption that these companies are still trading (and records at Companies House suggest this is the case) and are continuing to make the agreed contributions to the CVA fund, it is not fanciful to suggest that the arrangement will in time be completed according to its terms and that the companies involved will thereafter remain active. 13 Potentially, therefore, 27% of the companies in the entire population of CVAs for 2006 could be denominated as 'successful' according to the conventional definition of 'success' which we outlined above.
Of the entire population, 31% of the companies were subsequently dissolved after an insolvency procedure 14 and a further 22% remain subject to an insolvency procedure. 15 The overwhelming likelihood is that this 22% will eventually meet the same fate of dissolution. Thus, over half of the CVAs approved in 2006 saw the procedure terminated prematurely and so may be labelled 'failures'. Perhaps the most intriguing category of case is that where the company in question does not remain active and is dissolved without further procedure. 16 A sample of such cases is analysed in further detail later in this report, but for the present it can be observed that it would be disingenuous to describe these all as 'failed' CVAs: indeed, as will be seen, 17 some of them deliver highly positive results, at least as far as creditors are concerned.
This report now proceeds to examine, in the first instance, a series of findings for the entire sample of CVAs as regards a number of variables and then goes on to a similar analysis of cases in certain of the categories of 'outcome' as outlined above.
18 This allows for a comparison of results as between different categories of outcome and, further, an identification of questions which might further inform the central research enquiry into the overall efficacy of the CVA procedure as a whole.
Analysis of the Entire Sample
Size of Companies entering CVAs
It was possible to determine the 'size' of the company in question in 90% of the cases in the sample.
19 Chart 4, below, illustrates the proportion of small, medium and large companies in the sample. 13 This proposition is investigated further, below, by reference to the proposed and actual durations of those CVAs which were terminated prematurely. 14 I.e., administration, a CVL or compulsory liquidation. 15 As note 13, above. 16 Accounting for 18% of the entire population: see Chart 3, above. 17 Below, At page 3, 19 Information on accounting exemptions is available from the company's 'profile' page on Companies House Direct. Thus companies were categorised as 'small', 'medium' or large when that information was available.
Ostensibly there appears to be strong bias towards the use of the CVA procedure for small companies. However, as a significant majority of companies in the UK are small, this finding should be treated with some caution and investigated further. The Company Register Statistics 20 provides information on the number of companies registered at Companies House and, further, how many of these are public companies. There does not, however, appear to be any statistical analysis of companies according to their size. The statistics for November 2010 indicate that in England and Wales of all the active companies on the register 9,543, out of a total of 2,463,862, were public companies. 21 The DTI Report on Companies for [2005] [2006] 22 provides a number of different analyses of Companies House data but, again and regrettably, not specifically on the size of companies on the register. It does, however, give information on the issued share capital of such companies and in the period of the report 74% of companies had issued share capital of less than £100 and a further 15% had issued capital of less than £20,000. Only 2% of companies had issued share capital of over £500,000.
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To extrapolate from this information any propositions on the profile of companies by size in England and Wales may be questionable. However, it is indisputable that public companies are, in general terms, much larger than private ones, and, further, the larger the issued share capital of a company the 'larger' it is likely to be. If this is correct, it is interesting to note that, in our sample, the incidence of large companies (4% of the sample) is probably higher than the incidence of large companies registered in England and Wales. Further exploration of this point, firstly as to whether it is even well made and secondly, if so, why this occurs, might yield some useful findings.
Type of CVA used
As noted above, the database characterised the CVA as either 'stand-alone', in administration or with moratorium. Section 1A and Schedule A1 of the Insolvency Act 2000 came into force on 1 January 2003 and provided 24 for the directors of an eligible company 25 to obtain a moratorium in relation to that company whilst a CVA proposal is put to and approved by creditors. 26 In our sample, the proportion of each type of CVA is illustrated in Chart 5, below.
The CVA with moratorium procedure was introduced for eligible companies in order to remedy a perceived weakness in the traditional CVA procedure, that being that in the period between a company's directors formulating and presenting a CVA proposal to creditors and such proposal being approved, any creditor could take enforcement action against the company thus scuppering the proposal's chances of approval. It was hoped that the availability of a moratorium in this period would address this weakness and, as a corollary, increase the use of CVAs and the incidence of corporate rescue. It would appear from Chart 5 above that the CVA with moratorium procedure is in fact very little used.
Of course, a moratorium can also be accessed through the use of the administration procedure coupled with a CVA, but, interestingly, of the large and medium sized companies 27 for which information on the type of CVA used was available, all had resort to the stand-alone CVA rather than the CVA within administration. It may, therefore, be that in certain circumstances the lack of a moratorium may not be as serious an impediment to the desired outcome as once thought. Certainly, the fact that 86% of the CVAs in the sample are 'stand-alone' may support this hypothesis: a total of 128 companies (72% of the entire sample) used this type of CVA when the moratorium procedure was available, so again there is some indication that the moratorium was not considered necessary. The reasons for this might perhaps be discerned through further research, although it might be speculated that the reasonably 'simple' capital structures of these companies, having only a single secured lender and relatively few major creditors, 28 and perhaps having access to 'insider' funding', will facilitate a standstill pending consideration of a CVA.
CVAs by location
The most frequent location for CVAs in the sample is London, followed by Yorkshire and Lancashire. In 11% of the cases in the sample the location was unknown. There appear to be no other notable 'trends' in this respect. 27 For which the CVA with moratorium procedure is not available. 28 According to this taxonomy, 11 out of the 21 firms effecting three or more CVAs were independent (52%), 4 were regional (19%), 5 were national (24%) and only one major (5%). In other words, a significant majority of the CVAs in the subsample were carried out by independent firms. This is perhaps not particularly surprising, given that, as noted earlier 32 , the majority of CVAs were of small companies, but it is by no means the case that the size of company in the CVA correlates closely with the size of firm: for example, the national firms' presence in this sample related almost exclusively to 'small' CVAs, although the one major firm (KPMG) was indeed involved in CVAs of large companies.
The remaining firms in the sample carried out one or two CVAs during 2006, and can be profiled as follows: 30 This category, by 2009, had lost one firm and, of course, many of the Vantis branches were acquired by Tenon in 2010. 31 It should be noted that some firms in the independent category, due to their high level of growth, may now perhaps be considered 'regionals': a good example would be MCR (previously Menzies). 32 At p.9.
Overall, therefore, a significant majority of the CVAs in the entire sample were carried out by 'smaller' firms, in the regional or independent categories. The major firms focused almost exclusively on large company CVAs, but no similar pattern emerges for the firms in the national category.
Duration of CVAs
It is perhaps the perceived wisdom that CVAs are generally entered into for a period of three years. Of course, it is open to the directors and nominee to propose any length for the arrangement. Chart 9, below, illustrates the incidence of a range of actual durations in the sample of 177 CVAs.
As can be seen from the above chart, well over half the CVAs in the sample lasted for less than eighteen months, but a further 10% lasted for three years or more.
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Given that, as noted above, 34 over half of the CVAs in the sample resulted in an insolvent outcome, there is nothing particularly surprising about the fact that so many lasted for a relatively short period, as they would inevitably have been the subject of a premature termination due to 'failure' of the CVA.
Information on the proposed duration of the CVA was also included on the database where it was available, although this turned out to be the case in only 32 (18%) of the cases in the sample, largely due to the fact that the proposals themselves were not included in the documentation. Chart 10, below, illustrates the range of predicted durations for these 32 CVAs.
Although this sub-sample is a small one, it appears to demonstrate that the longevity of CVA proposals is somewhat higher than the authors at first expected, with over half of the projected durations being for five years or over. It may be that this is now the 'standard' CVA duration, which of itself is a matter ripe for further investigation. It is worth noting here that the 'typical' proposal from our samples involved 35 an arrangement by which the company would make monthly contributions to the supervisor, these being held for the creditors for distribution at the end of the CVA. This type of CVA envisages, therefore, a period during which funds which might otherwise have amounted to distributable profits 36 being diverted from equity holders to creditors, the quid pro quo being that the company will eventually be returned to its equity holders intact and leaving them as residual claimants with some real financial interest in the company. One important aspect of the possible move towards longer CVAs is that it effectively locks out equity holders from at least a proportion of their possible dividend for a considerable period. 37 Where the company in question does not distribute dividends, and instead its owners are also managers/directors who receive a return by way of salary calculated with reference to profits 38 the same applies: such owner/managers are subjecting themselves to an 'austerity' schedule of quite some 35 To the extent that it is possible to determine what amounts to a typical proposal from the information available. As noted earlier, at p.2, we did not have access to the actual proposals presented to creditors, but rather, through practitioner reports, to an abridged version or summary of them. 36 Or at least been available to meet owner/managers salaries: this is, of course, somewhat speculative. 37 On the assumption that the CVA runs its full 60 month course, 38 Hopefully, profits available for the purpose of distribution: see s.830 Companies Act 2006.
length. There is, of course, absolutely nothing objectionable in this, 39 but it is simply noted here as one possible explanation for the reasonably high proportion of CVAs that are prematurely terminated: to put it simply, owner/managers may find that the effort of continuing to trade, when little or no return is generated to them personally, ultimately hollow. A further possibility is that whilst the CVAs in question extend the company's trading life, underlying deficiencies in the business or its management are not subsequently addressed: plus ça change, and the precariousness simply results in a further, inevitable crisis.
Equally, if the five year CVA is in fact the model, this may deter managers from opting for the procedure in the first place. Again, this is speculative, and the matter could usefully be investigated further, but well-advised directors may find themselves with alternative strategies from which to choose, the obvious one being a pre-pack administration under which they themselves acquire the business and assets of the company free of its debts. 40 Finally, it is also worth considering the position of CVA creditors in this context. In the first instance, any move towards the five year CVA may in fact be creditordriven: in her research into insolvency outcomes for the Insolvency Service, one of the co-authors of this report noted that Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, often a major unsecured creditor in any insolvency, was beginning to suggest amendments to CVA proposals extending them from three years to five. 41 Secondly, the terms of the CVA may provide for interim distributions to creditors during the course of the CVA: 42 where they do not, it might be thought surprising that creditors would agree to wait five years for their share in any eventual distribution, although it should also be noted that distributions in administrations 43 and liquidations may not take place until some years after the commencement of the procedure. 44 There does not, however, appear to be any significant risk for CVA creditors from early termination of a CVA as any contributions would, under the principles enunciated in Re NT Gallagher & Son Ltd, 45 be ring-fenced under a 'trust' for their benefit and would not be available to other creditors in the subsequent liquidation.
Of the 32 cases where information on the projected duration of the CVA was available, 22 (69%) were terminated at an earlier point than proposed, 9 (28%) continued for longer than the projected duration 46 and one lasted for the period 39 Indeed, one might suggest that the 'ethos' of the CVA requires this sacrifice from owners and managers, It is also worth noting that some of the CVA proposals in the sample envisage that contributions to the CVA may rise according to the profits of the company, which again appears to be a reasonable term. 40 The choice would therefore seem to be between an immediate outlay to purchase the business and assets and a period of deprivation from participation in its profits. There were a few instances of this in the cases in our sample, although it is difficult to tell whether this is the norm without access to the full proposals. 43 Usually by way of a conversion to CVL: see para.83, Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986. 44 The authors would tentatively estimate that for administrations and CVLs there will be at least a two year hiatus between commencement and distribution, if, indeed, any distribution is made, and that closure of cases may in many cases take substantially longer than this. 45 [2002] EWCA Civ 404. 46 With two of these cases still ongoing.
predicted. Overall, it is suggested that this is another area in which further research would yield valuable information on the practice of CVAs.
CVAs by Business Sector
The database records information on the business sector in which each company operates by using SIC 03 Codes, which classify business activities and which can be filed at Companies House on the registration of the company or at some later date. For ease of exposition, codes were 'bunched' into a generic category: the SIC 03 classification is extraordinarily detailed and contains well over one hundred different codes, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to graphically illustrate the frequency of each individual code. Chart 11 illustrates the frequency of CVAs by business sector for the 174 companies in the sample for which this information was available.
The category of 'other business activities' accounts for over one fifth of the companies entering CVAs in the sample. This rather elusive term in fact refers to a variety of 'service-based' activities, including legal and accounting services, market research, management consultancy, advertising, recruitment and secretarial services. In very general terms, these tend to be 'people businesses' and, again very generally, their main assets would likely be their human resources and their goodwill. The next two most featured activities are construction and general retail: as far as construction is concerned, one might postulate that this is a specialist sector in some respects, as it is often the case that there might well be a strong impetus amongst contracting partners (which may well include creditors) to give a construction company an opportunity to 'restructure', not least because this sector often involves quite complicated contractual connections between multiple parties which might prove difficult to renegotiate were the CVA company unable to fulfil its obligations. 47 In terms of retail company CVAs, these have been prominently featured in the media in relation to large companies in particular, 48 and, again, further research may suggest that the CVA is a procedure which can be used particularly effectively in this sector. 49 It is perhaps of note that manufacturing industries account for only 17% of the cases in this sample, which may be indicative of the fact that CVAs are most suitable vehicles for 'tertiary' industries, although it may equally simply reflect the decline of manufacturing and the rise of financial and other services over the last quarter century.
Creditors and CVAs
General Observations
The underlying rationale of the CVA, as far as creditors of an insolvent company are concerned, is that it offers them a better return than they would realise if some other form of insolvency procedure were to be commenced in relation to the company. There is also the possibility that trade creditors might retain a customer for the future, 50 and in certain cases this will be an attractive feature of a CVA proposal. 51 In certain respects, creditors ostensibly have little to lose by agreeing to a CVA proposal which appears likely to deliver a better return than, say, an administration or a liquidation: any payments into the CVA will be held exclusively for them, 52 and if the CVA does not deliver the proposed return they are entitled to prove for the balance in a subsequent insolvency procedure. 53 Thus the CVA would appear to offer, firstly, a share in any payments made into the arrangement and, if it fails, the possibility of a dividend through the subsequent realisation of the assets of the insolvent company.
Without having access to the actual proposals for the companies in the sample, it is difficult to draw any general conclusions as to how these are actually 'sold' to creditors. It is also worth pointing out that there exists no consolidated data on those proposals that are rejected. Equally, where amendments to proposals are suggested by creditors these appear to be, for the most part, 'standard form' modifications usually proposed by HMRC, 54 and will often require the supervisor of 47 Quaere the possibility of the existence of step-in rights, however. the CVA to terminate the arrangement on the happening of certain events. 55 It is probably safe to conjecture, however, that creditors vote to accept CVA proposals because they believe that they will, in one way or another, be better off as a result of them.
The main danger to creditors in this respect is that the CVA is prematurely terminated and that the company has in fact depleted assets which would have been available to them in a liquidation or administration during the course of trading the business on. Unfortunately, it is impossible to quantify how often this actually occurs from the information available in the documentation accessed. Equally, and regrettably, without the benefit of qualitative data an account of the decision making processes of creditors in determining whether to accept a CVA proposal is not viable here. One might postulate that it involves a cost/benefit analysis on the part of the creditors in question, and whilst this might be true of larger, repeat player creditors such as HMRC 56 it is not unlikely that in certain circumstances very little thought is given to the question of whether to approve or not, and that voting is a mechanical exercise and carried out by proxy.
The analysis that follows focuses almost exclusively on the position of unsecured creditors in CVAs. This is largely because so little information on the position of secured and preferential creditors was available from the documentation used to compile the database. It is worth noting here that proposals may not, of course, affect the enforcement or priority rights of secured or preferential creditors without their consent: 57 as far as secured creditors are concerned, however, it is realistic to assume that they will have had no objection to the CVA as, were the opposite to be the case, they might have simply enforced their security.
58 As far as preferential creditors are concerned, these will for the most part be employees of the CVA company 59 and might therefore be supposed to have a very real interest in the proposal being accepted: in short, their jobs may be at stake. 60 Given the paucity of information on these two classes of creditors, any further observations on their position would be speculative in the extreme. Therefore only a brief consideration of what data is available will be offered here, before returning to the position of unsecured creditors in CVAs.
Secured Creditors
As noted above, in many of the practitioner reports from which the database was compiled there was very little information on secured creditors generally. However, of the 177 cases on the database, 87 (49%) reports contained information on the level of secured debt and a further 41 cases (23%) reported on the secured creditor return. It is not unlikely that in many of the cases for which information was unavailable there were actually no secured creditors, but in the absence of confirmation of this inference only those cases where this much was definitively stated were used in the analysis. The average secured debt from the sub-sample of 55 Such modifications are routinely proposed and routinely accepted: HMRC's standard modifications featured in around 25% of the cases and may have been an undocumented feature of a significantly larger proportion of the sample. It would appear from the above that the level of secured debt is usually quite low in CVAs, with only 5% of the companies in our sub-sample owing over £1,000,000 to secured creditors. Indeed, nearly half of the cases in the sub-sample involved companies which had no secured creditors, and 18% owed less than £100,000 to secured creditors. One of the co-authors of this report has compiled a database of 2,911 administrations and administrative receiverships taking place between September 2001 and January 2006, and in relation to the cases on that database (for which much more complete information was available, the form of practitioner report in these procedures being more detailed) 25% involved companies where no secured debt was owed, in 12% the level of secured debt was less than £100,000 and in 19% the level of secured debt exceeded £1,000,000.
Can this be taken as evidence that the CVA is used more often in cases where little or no secured debt is owed? A comparison of findings from two different databases 61 is arguably specious but it might be possible to look more closely into this matter. Intuitively one might consider that the CVA is a model particularly well suited to companies having no secured debt, and, as noted above, a large proportion of the 90 cases in our sample for which no information on secured debt was available may very well be those where none was in fact owed. Having said that, it might also be contended that the presence of secured debt is not 61 Containing data from very different time periods and on procedures in which secured debt is inherently more likely to be owed, particularly in the case of administrative receivership. necessarily a critical barrier to the successful proposal and implementation of a CVA: secured creditors are reasonably well-insulated as regards the procedure, and might be content to allow the company to proceed in the knowledge that, if matters deteriorate, they will still be able to have recourse to their security.
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Of the 41 cases in the sample containing information on returns to secured creditors, 32 (78%) recorded a return of zero and 6 a 100% return. Of course, the return recorded here was from the CVA itself, and did not include any later return from a follow-on procedure where the CVA itself failed. A separate database was constructed in this regard to record information on any follow-on procedure although, given that so little information is available from practitioner reports in compulsory liquidations only those cases where the follow-on procedure was administration or a company voluntary liquidation (CVL) were analysed. Information on returns to secured creditors was available in 35 cases 63 and detailed in Chart 13, below.
It would be inappropriate to draw any conclusions as to whether secured creditors fare better or worse in a CVA than in any other form of insolvency procedure. Overall, where no returns were made in the CVA then 40% of those secured creditors received no return in the follow on procedure, but it is impossible to assess whether the position would have been any different had the company fallen into an administration or CVL without the CVA having taken place. It is difficult to 62 Subject to the point made above, at p.19, regarding the potential for asset depletion during the course of a CVA. Qualitative information from the lending arms of the major banks might address this question. 63 Almost a third of the 64 cases on the follow-on database are still ongoing so that no figures on returns are available. Note also that information that was not available from the CVA documentation was available and recorded in relation to the follow-on procedure.
see how the costs of the CVA would eat into the security, although this is a matter that might properly be the subject of further investigation. 64 Perhaps the central question arising here is whether the existence of secured debt, and, as a corollary, the approach of secured creditors to suggestions that a CVA be proposed to unsecured creditors, might have some overall impact on the use of the CVA.
Preferential Creditors
Very little information was available on the position of preferential creditors, although given that the implementation of a CVA proposal would possibly secure the employment of such creditors this is not surprising. In the vast majority of cases for which this information was available (82 (80%) of 103 cases) no preferential debt was owed at the commencement of the CVA. In terms of returns to preferential creditors, information was available in 20 cases, and all but 6 saw a 100% return.
It should, however, be acknowledged that preferential debt may well be incurred during the course of a CVA itself: employees continuing to work for the CVA company are not in any way protected by an 'expenses of the procedure' regime.
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The follow-on procedure database records 34 cases where, following a move from CVA to administration or voluntary liquidation, no preferential debt was owed and a further 26 cases where there were preferential creditors. Information on the return to preferential creditors from the follow-on procedure was available in 21 of these cases. In 15 of these cases the preferential creditors received a zero return and in only four were they paid in full. As with the similar position of secured creditors, it is not feasible to estimate whether the preferential creditors who received a zero return in a follow-on procedure would have been better served had the CVA never been implemented, not least because the amount owed to them would have been different at the commencement of the CVA from what it was at the commencement of the follow-on procedure.
Unsecured Creditors
Unsecured creditors are, of course, pivotal to the CVA as, for the most part, proposals will be directed to them and aimed at persuading them that the CVA will in some respects improve their prospects of a dividend. Information on this class of creditors was more often available from the practitioner reports (although by no means complete). One preliminary point that should be made is that HMRC was a constant presence amongst unsecured creditors and, often, the most significant creditor in terms of the amount owed by some distance. 66 As noted above, 67 the VA service assesses all CVA proposals on behalf of HMRC and further research might throw some interesting light on this appraisal. Unfortunately it was not possible to estimate the proportion of unsecured debt that was owed to HMRC 68 in the cases on the database. However, Chart 14, below, illustrates the general level of unsecured debt, this information being available in 132 (75%) of the 177 cases on the database. 64 It may be that the value of the security depletes during the course of the CVA. 65 Unless the proposal specifically makes provision for this. 66 This is a common feature of most insolvency procedures. 67 See page 20, n.56. 68 CVA reports do not contain schedules of creditors or statements of affairs.
The average unsecured debt in this sub-sample was £1,796,681. Two cases involved atypically high levels of unsecured debt 69 and, when these are taken out of the sub-sample, the average unsecured debt is £506,781. This may be compared with an average unsecured debt of £2,335,000 in administration and administrative receivership cases taken from the database referred to above, 70 but as observed there this comparison is probably unhelpful.
Figures on returns to unsecured creditors were available for 167 of the 177 cases in the entire sample. It will be recalled that the sample contained cases ending in a variety of 'outcomes', and a more detailed analysis of returns from certain different outcomes follows later in this report. For the present, the average return to unsecured creditors from the sample was 13%. This may actually represent a reasonably respectable average return when compared with average dividends from other insolvency procedures, although a perhaps disappointingly high proportion of cases resulted in zero return, as illustrated by Chart 15, below.
69 Both involved group CVAs and inter-company indebtedness, which would account for this seeming anomaly. 70 See p.21, n.61.
Poor dividends to unsecured creditors from insolvency proceedings are well documented and it is perhaps to some extent heartening to note that dividends of over 30% were returned in 14% of the cases in the sample. Equally, to the extent that unsecured creditors do not receive a full dividend they may prove for the balance in a subsequent liquidation or administration. 71 However, in 49% of the cases here creditors received no return at all from the CVA. Of the many questions arising from this finding, two can be at least in some measure addressed by the information available from the database. This first is what creditors expected to receive from the CVA: a dividend of zero might actually come as no great surprise if the predicted dividend was 2%, but equally an ostensibly good dividend of, say, 40% would probably be a major disappointment if the prediction had been 75%. The second question goes to whether there is any follow-on procedure, and, if so, do creditors who did not receive the predicted dividend recover any of the balance in that procedure?
As to the first question, the database recorded the projected return to unsecured creditors where this information was available from practitioner reports. This was not frequently the case, with only 41 (23%) reports including this information. The projected return was then compared to the actual return in the CVA (available for comparison in 40 cases). Chart 16, below, illustrates the frequency of certain percentage bands of projected returns to unsecured creditors. 71 Re NT Gallagher Ltd, n.45 above As can be seen from the above Chart, 17% of the cases in the sub-sample returned over 100% of the projected return to unsecured creditors. These cases are interesting, in that the projected return was proffered as the minimum return, with the prospect of an enhanced dividend dependent upon the profitability of the company in question.
72 12% of the cases returned the exact projected dividend to creditors and a further 8% returned 90% -99% of the projected dividend. The remainder of the cases (63%) feature actual dividends falling considerably short of what was projected, with 35% returning no dividend at all. These cases are somewhat worrisome in terms of creditor confidence because the projected dividend in each was reasonably high, falling between 33% and 83%.
As to the second question, it proved impossible to answer: the follow-on database records the level of unsecured debt at the commencement of the procedure, but very few practitioner reports specified what proportion of that amount was owed to CVA creditors. Trading within a CVA will, of course, generate its own liabilities and those that remain undischarged will, of course, fall to be moderated within the follow-on procedure. It is, however, worth noting that in 43 (68%) of the 62 cases on the follow-on database unsecured creditors received a zero return: it is not, of course, self-evident that these cases included creditors from the original CVA, 73 nor, indeed, is it possible to determine with any degree of certainty what proportion of the projected CVA dividend any such creditors actually received in the CVA itself.
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72 This was not a feature exclusive to these particular cases: dividends dependent upon profits were also offered in other cases but the profits in question never materialised. 73 Although this is highly likely, given that a follow-on procedure was instigated. 74 If payments were made on an interim basis.
What is clear, though, is the inherent hazard of the CVA: in our sample, a significant proportion of cases involved a follow-procedure, and it would appear from Chart 17, below, that 'failed' CVAs may simply serve to generate more debt which is doomed to remain undischarged.
The average unsecured debt in follow-on procedures was £543,662, which is actually slightly higher than that seen in the sample for CVAs generally. 75 There is little point in performing any detailed analysis on the level of return from the follow-on procedure, except to note that 68% of the cases record a zero return. 76 It is impossible to discern from the documentation whether or not any creditors of the original CVA continued to trade with the company during the CVA: if so, and to the extent that they did not receive a dividend from the CVA or the follow-on procedure, this represents something of a 'double-whammy', although it might be rather unsympathetically argued that, like the creditors of A Salomon & Sons Ltd, 'they have only themselves to blame '. 77 This section gives an overview of the position of unsecured creditors in CVAs, and more detailed analysis on this matter in terms of CVAs with particular outcomes follows below. Before that, the question of costs of CVAs and the certain particular features of follow-on procedures remain to be considered. 
CVAs and costs
Very little information on projected costs of the CVA was available from practitioner reports and therefore no comparison can be made between projected and actual costs. As far as the latter are concerned, the figure for costs drawn (i.e., actually paid out) was available in 168 (95%) of the 177 cases in the sample) from the final receipts and payments account in the notice of completion or termination of the CVA. For the purposes of the database, costs comprise, for the most part, the fees of the nominee/supervisor of the arrangement, but where applicable included legal fees associated with the agreement, and any bonds, statutory advertising costs, stationary and postage costs, insurance costs and travel costs incurred and paid by the supervisor/nominee, and any irrecoverable VAT. It should be noted that the figure recorded in the database is for costs actually drawn by the supervisor: where contributions made by the company were not sufficient to meet the actual costs incurred the effect is that the nominee/supervisor's fees bear the deficit. Chart 17, below illustrates the proportion of CVAs in the sub-sample falling within certain bands of costs drawn.
The average cost drawn in this sub-sample was £25,368, and obviously the enormous variance seen here is likely to be attributable at least in part to the variance in CVA durations.
78 This is investigated further, below. Equally, the complexity of the case may increase costs, and particularly practitioner and legal fees. It is worth re-emphasising that the Chart above is based on those costs actually drawn by the supervisor, and that in some cases these would fall below the time costs actually incurred, although it is impossible, from the information 78 See above, p.15. contained in the reports, to estimate how often, and to what extent, this is the case. Chart 18, below, details the average duration of CVAs falling into particular costs bands.
As might be expected, given that a high proportion of costs comprises the fees of the supervisor, costs rise roughly in accordance with duration, although there are some diversions from this general pattern. Most notable are costs in the £40,000 -£50,000 and £100,000+ bands, where the average duration of the CVA is perhaps lower than expected. It is difficult to account for this ostensible anomaly with any degree of conviction, as information on the complexity of the case was not a common feature of the documentation used to compile the database. It does not seem capricious to suggest that supervisors and/or nominees may have to expend considerable time on cases which last for a relatively short period, but without the benefit of further research on how time costs and other fees are incurred no further explanation can be offered.
CVAs and Follow-on Procedures
As noted above, 79 a separate database was constructed containing information on cases where the CVA was prematurely terminated and the company then entered a different insolvency procedure. This database comprised 62 companies, all of which entered either administration or CVL after the termination of the CVA. Cases where the company entered compulsory liquidation were excluded for the simple reason that the follow-on documentation was extremely sparse and little or no relevant 79 See p.22. information was available from it. Of the companies on this database, 45% entered administration and 55% CVL. Of particular interest here is the outcomes of these follow-on procedures, which were categorised as follows: a) Break-up sale: the corporate assets were sold on a break-up basis b) Break-up sale to connected party: essentially, the directors of the company purchased its assets on a break-up basis c) Business sale to unconnected party: the business of the company was sold as a going concern to an independent and unconnected purchaser d) Business sale to connected party: the business was sold as a going concern to its directors e) Pre-pack sale to connected party: the business was sold as a going concern in a pre-packaged arrangement to its directors f) Pre-pack sale to unconnected party: the business of the company was sold as a going concern to an independent and unconnected purchaser g) Ongoing: no final outcome has yet been achieved.
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Chart 19, below, illustrates the frequency of each of these outcomes.
In 64% of the cases on this database the outcome was terminal, in the sense that the business of the company, let alone the company itself, did not survive the procedure. Its assets were sold on a break-up basis (albeit that in 3% of cases the purchaser was a connected party, and so might have some plans to resurrect the business as a sole trader or housed within a new company). However, 30% of the cases here saw at least a temporary survival of the business: whilst the CVA did not save the company, nevertheless its business was sold as a going concern, sometimes in a pre-pack arrangement, and so lived to fight another day. 81 The incidence of connected party sales is high, with 70% in total of the going concern sales involving a 'phoenix'. Perhaps not surprisingly, all but two of the going concern sales took place within administration, and the majority of break-up sales were effected through a CVL.
It is worth noting here that in 65% of the cases on the database the same firm acted as both supervisor of the CVA and administrator or liquidator in the follow on procedure. This is probably to be expected: many of the insolvency practitioner reports noted that the CVA proposal was modified to include HMRC's standard terms, which themselves include a condition that, should the proposed contributions to the CVA not be made at any given point or points, the supervisor should take steps to place the company into liquidation by petitioning for a winding up order. Where such a condition is not included, but a follow-on procedure is nevertheless considered necessary by either the company or the supervisor, the incumbent supervisor might well be the obvious candidate for the position of administrator or liquidator.
Nor is this incident inherently objectionable. The incumbent supervisor will have at least some knowledge of the company's finance and operations which will inevitably prove useful in terms of expediting any follow-on procedure, and might possibly also reduce its costs. Moreover, the liquidator in a CVL would in any case have to have his appointment confirmed by a s.98 Insolvency Act 1986 meeting, and to the extent that CVA creditors are entitled to vote at such a meeting 82 they might be in a position to prevent the incumbent supervisor from undertaking the position of liquidator. As far as follow-on administration appointments are concerned, there might arguably be less 'protection' for creditors in this respect, as the company itself might secure the appointment of the supervisor under para.22 of Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986. However, such an appointment might be 'blocked' where a secured creditor wishes to appoint an administrator other than the CVA supervisor by virtue of para.14 of Schedule B1.
Analysis of CVAs by Outcome
Introduction
As described above, 83 the CVAs in the sample were categorised according to different outcomes and the numbers of each outcome sampled were roughly in proportion to those for the CVA sweep. What follows is an analysis of the cases in the sample according to outcome, although not all outcomes are analysed: where a follow-on insolvency procedure remained ongoing information on returns to creditors would inevitably be unavailable, and as this was considered particularly important to the investigation as a whole no further analysis was undertaken. Further, where the number of cases falling within a particular outcome was very small any further analysis would be meaningless and none was undertaken. 81 Whether or not these businesses, housed in new entities, continued to survive to the present is not documented here. 82 As would be the case where their CVA entitlements not met. 83 At pp.3 -4.
Active CVAs
CVAs falling under the 'active' outcome would, by definition, be defined as 'successful' in that the companies subject to them continue to trade to the present. It might, by comparing some of their features to those seen in relation to the entire sample, be possible to tentatively suggest certain corporate characteristics which might contribute to the achievement of what is arguably the most positive outcome described in our sample. At the very least, the exercise may suggest further potentially productive research questions.
Active CVAs by company size
When compared with Chart 4, above, 84 a higher proportion of large and medium sized companies fall into the active category than in the entire sample. Equally, the percentage of small companies in the active category is 10% lower than that in the entire sample. The question, which should perhaps be the subject of further research, is therefore whether a CVA is more likely to result in the survival of the company, if this is in fact the ultimate objective, where the company in question is large or medium sized.
Active CVAs by Type
The above chart is of interest in that it reports a higher percentage of 'in administration' CVAs than that of the entire sample, and, indeed, the only 'with moratorium' in the entire sample led to an active outcome. Again, it is difficult to clarify with any certainty why the use of the administration procedure as an umbrella for the CVA might appear to lead to a positive outcome: one possible explanation is that there is indeed some force in the argument that the extensive moratorium offered by the procedure, and the breathing space it provides, allows for better designed CVA proposals to be devised and presented to creditors. Of course, the CVA with moratorium procedure also offers this advantage and was used, in our sample, successfully. Once again, therefore, some interesting research questions arise from this analysis.
Active CVAs by Firm
Chart 7, above, 85 illustrated those firms whose practitioners supervised three or more CVAs in the sample and the percentage of CVAs in this sub-sample carried out by each firm. Chart 22, below, illustrates the percentage of active CVAs by firm.
It should be noted that the firms in this sub-sample supervised either two or one of the active CVAs. Of the five firms supervising two active CVAs, two fall into the national category of firms and one each into the major, regional and independent categories. Indeed, the incidence of each category of firm in the active CVA sample is markedly different to that seen in relation to the entire sample.
86 Chart 23, below, suggests that active CVAs are more frequently supervised by the 'larger' firms, falling into the major, national and, particularly, regional categories than CVAs in the entire sample generally.
No firm conclusions can be drawn from this finding however. When considering the apparent 'bias' towards large companies in the active CVA sample, noted above in Chart 20, such CVAs are clearly more likely to be supervised by major or national firms, which have the resources necessary to deal with them. Moreover, it may well be the case, as discussed below, that recourse to the CVA procedure may not necessarily be for the purpose of 'rescuing' the company itself, and instead might seek to achieve an orderly and more value-maximising wind-down than could be achieved in an administration or liquidation. In such circumstances, supervision by a larger firm might well be unnecessary. Further research might throw some additional light on this matter.
Active CVAs by Duration
Chart 24, above, illustrates the range of durations for all active CVAs in the sample, and the results might be considered somewhat unanticipated. Whilst far more of the active CVAs last for over 3 years as compared with the corresponding percentage of CVAs in the entire sample, 27% of active CVAs were subject to the procedure for one year or less and nearly half of the active CVAs lasted for less than two years. In other words, 'successful' CVAs may not necessarily conform to the long-term trading model sometimes contemplated as the norm.
Additional notes taken but not recorded on the database suggest that, in relation to the active cases above, the CVA is appropriate to overcome a short-term but nevertheless very serious cash-flow problem. Although supplementary information was not available in all of the cases in this category, it was possible to identify a number of cases where the proposal differed from the standard periodic contribution template: five cases contemplated, and achieved, a one-off contribution at the end of a specified period, which was to be distributed amongst unsecured creditors pari passu and which would deliver a significantly higher return than offered on an immediate liquidation. A further two cases used the CVA to negotiate a restructuring of secured debt, and delivered a 100% return to unsecured creditors: indeed, a common feature of many of the active CVAs is that a secured creditor did not participate in any eventual distribution and instead was content to leave the security interest unenforced during and after the CVA.
The absence of secured debt may also be a factor relevant to the 'success' of CVAs. In the sample of 26 active CVAs, 42% of the companies owed no secured debt, as compared to 35% of companies in the remainder of the sample, although this should be treated with some caution, given the absence of information on levels of secured debt for 91 of the companies in the entire sample. Moreover, and to the extent that secured creditors may 'impede' CVAs, 87 one might expect this to take the form of enforcing security before any proposal is put to creditors rather than during the CVA itself. Obviously, this possibility cannot be substantiated on the basis of the available information.
Active CVAs by business sector
As far as business sectors are concerned, 61% of the active CVA sample was taken up by companies performing 'other business activities', retail and other service activities, with the general retail sector accounting for a slightly higher percentage of active CVAs (15%) than within the entire sample (9%) A further 12% of the companies in the sample were service-based entities, so that almost three quarters of companies sampled carried on 'tertiary' businesses. This, however, is virtually identical to the proportion of service-based businesses in the entire sample, and so any suggestion that this type of company is more likely to emerge intact from a CVA would be groundless.
Active CVAs and Unsecured Creditor Returns
Chart 25, above, illustrates the level of return to unsecured creditors from active CVAs and, it should be observed, can be viewed highly positively. Unsecured creditors received half or more of their pre-CVA debt in almost one quarter of cases and over half of the companies returned a dividend of 25% or above to their unsecured creditors. The average return from active CVAs is 37%, as compared to 13% from the entire sample and it is submitted that this would far outstrip average returns from other insolvency procedures.
Information on projected dividends was not available for all the active CVA cases. However, for those cases where a projected dividend was stated in practitioner reports, the actual dividend was considerably higher in five cases but considerably lower in a further six. In two cases the projected and actual returns were identical.
Overall, therefore, this sub-sample of cases could properly be described as successful in that the company subject to the CVA remains active and trading and its creditors, for the most part, received a dividend very likely in excess of any that might have been paid in an alternative insolvency procedure. This report now proceeds to analyse those cases resulting in an 'insolvency' outcome. The analysis in relation to certain of these outcomes is rather less detailed, largely because of the cases within them all share common features, and the focus is rather on the level of returns to unsecured creditors.
CVAs followed by compulsory liquidation and dissolution
General features
All of the companies in the sub-sample of twenty two CVAs which were dissolved after compulsory liquidation were small and all were of the 'stand-alone' type of CVA. None lasted over two years, the average duration being 11 months, and in six of the twenty two cases in the sample the CVA was terminated less than one year after implementation. As far as firms supervising the CVAs in this sample, one particular independent firm supervised 6 (29%) of the cases, and a further 16 firms supervised one CVA each. Of these firms, three were national firms, two were regional and the remainder independent. No notable patterns emerge as regards the sector in which these companies operated.
CVAs dissolved after compulsory liquidation: returns to unsecured creditors
Chart 26 might be said to speak for itself. In terms of outcomes for unsecured creditors, the results are very poor, with nearly three quarters of the 22 cases resulting in a zero return. The average return to unsecured creditors was a miserable 1%. Information on the amount of secured debt owed at the commencement of the CVA was only available in 10 of the 22 cases, with the average unsecured debt being £253,406, which is roughly half of the average for the entire sample.
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Additional notes on the cases with this outcome observe a fairly common pattern once the CVA proposal had been accepted and the procedure implemented. In the majority of these cases the major creditor was HMRC, and the proposal typically involved the company agreeing to make monthly contributions to the CVA. In many cases HMRC's standard modifications were approved by creditors, so that, in the event of the company failing to make the agreed contribution, or falling into arrears in paying post-approval taxes, the supervisor came under an obligation to petition for the winding up of the company. In certain cases it appears that the supervisor did not in fact petition on the occurrence of 'default', probably because no funds were available to meet the costs of such petition, and that this was therefore left to HMRC.
Figures for costs drawn in the CVA in this sub-sample were available in 18 of the 22 cases. In four cases no costs were drawn, and the highest figure for costs drawn was £30,058. The average level of costs drawn was £12,100, just under half of average for the entire sample. 89 The critical question concerning this sub-sample is whether the CVA should ever have been contemplated, and that question simply cannot be answered here. It may well be that an immediate compulsory or creditors' voluntary winding up would have generated a better return for the creditors involved, and that costs drawn by the supervisors might, in such circumstances, have found their way to creditors. Such a contention, however, ignores the fact that a different procedure would have generated its own costs. Overall, it would appear that the cases in this sub-sample involved, at the very least, overly ambitious proposals and that the directors view of the company's prospects turned out to be ludicrously rosy. In other words, these cases seem appropriately denominated failures.
CVAs followed by administration and dissolution
General features
This sub-sample comprises 16 cases, all of them involving small companies. Thirteen of these cases were stand alone CVAs and the remaining three were implemented in administration. One independent firm supervised three of the CVAs, with the remainder being supervised by different firms. Of these thirteen firms, four were national, four regional and the remainder independent. The average duration of the cases in this sub-sample was 14 months, the longest lasting 27 months and the shortest only three.
For the most part, notes on these cases reveal a similar trend to that seen in relation to those CVAs resulting in dissolution after a compulsory liquidation: most involved 'trading' proposals with the company making monthly contributions, and most were terminated on the company's failure to make the agreed contribution or its falling into arrears with post-approval taxes. However, these cases did appear to generate more in terms of contributions, which possibly explains the choice of administration as the follow-on procedure. The figure for average costs drawn is £18, 880.
CVAs dissolved after administration: returns to unsecured creditors
It appears from Chart 27, above, that unsecured creditors fared better from those cases that moved into administration, rather than compulsory liquidation, after the termination of the CVA. Certainly the frequency of zero returns is lower, although still comprises half of the cases in the sub-sample. The average dividend is significantly higher, at 6%, possibly explicable by the generally higher level of monthly contributions made in this sub-sample. Whilst, therefore, the ultimate objective of these cases might have failed, it is tentatively suggested that the returns generated may not be less, and might possibly be higher, than might have been achieved in an immediate liquidation
CVAs followed by creditors' voluntary liquidation and dissolution
General features
This sub-sample comprises 24 cases where the CVA was terminated and the company entered a CVL, eventually leading to its dissolution. All the companies in the sub-sample were small and all the CVAs of the stand alone variety. Two firms, one regional and one independent, supervised two CVAs in this sample, and the remaining CVAs were divided between three national firms, two regional firms and sixteen independent firms. The average duration of the CVAs in the sub-sample was 13 months, with the longest lasting 32 months and the shortest a mere 2 months.
Again, the general reason for the termination in these cases appears to be the failure to make agreed contributions or to pay post-approval taxes, although the entry in voluntary liquidation is clearly driven by the company or the supervisor, rather than by any requirement of HMRC. Interestingly, this category of case generated the lowest average for costs drawn, at £9,848, notwithstanding that the average duration of the CVAs was only one month less than that for the administration cases and two months more than the compulsory liquidation cases. Equally interestingly, this category of cases generated the lowest overall return to unsecured creditors: 21 of the 24 cases returned a zero dividend, and a further two less than 6%. Only one case, with a 24% return, appeared to perform better than would have been the case on an immediate administration or liquidation.
CVAs dissolved without further procedure
General observations
This is probably the most intriguing sub-sample of all, in that none of the 36 companies comprised in it remain active but, equally, none of them subsequently entered an insolvency procedure following the termination of the CVA. All were dissolved, presumably by their directors under the procedure in what is now s.1003 Companies Act 2006.
90 Essentially, many of these cases appear, for the most part, to represent a form of 'exit-route' for all involved: the CVA is most often used as a vehicle to wind down a trading company which is insolvent but for which, for whatever reason, a more orthodox insolvency procedure is not considered appropriate.
In many of the cases in the sub-sample the CVA appears to have been used in preference to a CVL: this may be so as to allow a reasonably protracted period of trading during which ongoing contracts are completed, which would inevitably assist in optimising realisations for the benefit of creditors. Such a strategy may have been problematic in a liquidation, although this is pure speculation, and it is equally unclear as to why administration was not used: one possibility is that the projected costs of an administration were considered prohibitive, although again this explanation is little more than guesswork. In any event, there are some fascinating questions as to the decision-making processes of insolvency practitioners in particular in relation to this type of case. As will be seen, in many CVAs of this type the outcome for unsecured creditors seems reasonably positive, so that the ingenuity of practitioners in using the procedure in this way is probably to be recommended.
A further, smaller proportion of the cases in this sub-sample involved what might be termed 'failed' CVAs, in that they were terminated for non-compliance. Why no further insolvency procedure was subsequently commenced is something of a mystery, although in some cases it appears that there were insufficient funds to petition and, it seems, no creditor was therefore prepared to stand as petitioner for a winding up order.
Overall, this category encompasses a variety of cases, but might be reduced to two main classes, the exit-route CVA, where outcomes for creditors are perhaps surprisingly buoyant and the 'abandoned' CVA, which appears something of a polar opposite. Information on the size of company in this sub-sample was available in 32 of the 36 cases, and the pattern corresponds most closely to that seen for the 90 Although records demonstrating this definitively were not available in all cases. The predecessor to s.1003 is s. 652A Companies Act 1985. active category of CVA: 12.5% of the companies in the sub-sample were large, the size of 12.5% unknown and the remaining 75% were small companies. All but one of these CVAs were of the stand alone variety, with one CVA taking place within administration.
Twenty seven different firms acted as supervisor in these CVAs: two independent firms were particularly prominent, carrying out five and three between them, and three other firms, one national, one regional and one independent, supervised two CVAs in this sub-sample. 91 Two major firms, five national firms, four regional firms and eleven independent firms account for the remaining CVAs in the sample.
Duration of 'straight to dissolution' CVAs
The range of durations for CVAs in this subsample is, as demonstrated by Chart 28 above, varied. The majority (62%) were completed within 18 months, and it is notable that very few of the practitioner reports contained information on a forecasted duration: this may be because the objective of the CVA was to complete an orderly wind down of the company's operation and therefore the time it would take to accomplish this was uncertain, but this is a somewhat tentative observation. Again, the pattern for this type of CVA corresponds most closely, but not exactly, to that of the category of active CVAs. 91 All six with very good results for creditors.
Straight to dissolution CVAs: Returns to Unsecured creditors
The average return from cases in this sub-sample was 17%, second only to the return from active CVAs and so representing an overall respectable outcome. It is worth noting again that this category of cases seems to be comprised largely of wind-downs, but also includes what might be termed 'failed' CVAs, but with dividends of over 25% occurring in 22% of cases it is certainly arguable that the innovative use of the CVA procedure here is beneficial for unsecured creditors. Having said that, a zero return was recorded for 41% of the cases in the subsample. It is difficult to ascertain with certainty whether these cases were commenced with the objective of winding down or whether the objective was to rescue the company, or indeed, whether creditors expected a significantly higher return: no projections were made as to a dividend in any of the cases in the subsample.
However, in additional notes not recorded on the database 10 of these cases in the sub-sample were reported as failed CVAs, and a further 13 cases categorised as fully implemented. The remainder seem to fall somewhere between the two, either having been partially implemented, but not to the extent hoped, or simply remain unexplained. This 'type' of CVA, therefore, certainly has the potential to deliver superior results to creditors where it is used to effect a wind-down of the company's operations, but this aspiration may not always reach fruition and may, indeed, fail completely.
One conceivably worrisome aspect of this category of CVA is the perceived absence of scrutiny of directors' conduct. Section 7A Insolvency Act 1986 only requires nominees or supervisors of CVAs to make a report to the Secretary of State where it appears that a director of the subject company is guilty of an offence for which he is criminally liable in connection with either a moratorium or the voluntary arrangement itself. This section therefore applies to a much narrower range of conduct than would be the case in an administration or a liquidation. Given that no subsequent administration or liquidation takes place, it is possible 92 that directors who might have been liable for, say, wrongful trading, escape further oversight. It is, of course, to be hoped that practitioners acting as nominees or supervisors in a CVA who consider that a possible action in this respect might be mounted would take the necessary steps to place the company in liquidation. However, it is also the case that supervisors and nominees do not report generally on directors conduct: and therefore the Secretary of State may not be alerted to directors' conduct which might warrant disqualification proceedings.
Costs in straight to dissolution CVAs
The average costs drawn in CVAs in this sub-sample is £15,709. However, this figure is perhaps 'inflated' by one unusual case of the trade-out of one company in a group, where costs of £182,149 were drawn, costs of this level being most usually associated with cases in the 'active' category of cases. If this arguably anomalous case is taken out of the equation, the average for costs drawn shrinks to £10,954. This compares favourably with all other types of CVA with the exception of the CVA where the company is dissolved following a CVL. 92 Although not necessarily likely: further research on this question might be desirable.
In the final analysis, therefore, the 'straight to dissolution' CVA poses some tantalising questions, and might, in some cases, be seen as a tribute to the resourcefulness of those practitioners recommending the use of the procedure in this way. On the other hand, there may be cause for concern in that this type of CVA may represent something of a soft landing for directors who might otherwise find themselves the subject of disqualification proceedings. It is submitted that this phenomena merits further research, and in particular into the decision-making methods of practitioners called upon to advise on the optimal route to an orderly wind-down of distressed companies.
Concluding observations
This report generates as many questions as it does answers. On present findings, it can be stated that the CVA procedure is certainly effective in terms of rescuing companies and delivering superior returns where the arrangement is not prematurely terminated: but this, of course, is stating the obvious. The level of returns in such cases is undeniably high in relative terms, and it is to be hoped that those companies emerging intact will enjoy profitable trading into the long-term. Equally positive results may be achieved by using the CVA procedure to realise maximum value even where it is envisaged that the company will subsequently cease to exist. This is perhaps the most unexpected finding, and should be factored into any definition of 'success' when it comes to evaluating CVAs.
Where CVAs fail, on the other hand, in the sense that they are prematurely terminated and fall into a follow-on insolvency procedure, outcomes are not as rosy. This is particularly the case where the follow-on procedure is a compulsory liquidation, but it would be interesting to attempt to gauge whether returns to creditors from these cases are on average less than from administrations and CVLs generally.
Obviously, there is considerable scope for further research into this matter: it is hoped, however, that this preliminary investigation might provide some insights into the manner in which the CVA is used and the implications for all involved.
